The end of each year offers an opportunity for reflection—an assessment of achievements and shortcomings across various areas of public and political life. For civil society organizations, 2025 was characterized by diverse and at times contradictory trends, mirroring developments in Bulgarian society as a whole. At least two conclusions can be drawn with certainty. First, the trends that shaped 2025 are likely to persist in the year(s) ahead, as none of them has been met with unequivocal clarity or firm consensus among the main political actors or the major societal groups. Second, developments affecting civil society organizations are increasingly exerting a deeper influence on ever broader segments of the population, even if many citizens remain unaware of this impact.

Several symbolic developments marked 2025 for non-governmental organizations in Bulgaria:

1.The rejection of the draft Law on the Registration of Foreign Agents (LRFA): It must be emphasized at the outset that this rejection did not represent a final resolution of this anti-democratic legislative initiative. Rather, it should be seen as a pause—a comma rather than a full stop—in a saga that is expected to continue.

The LRFA illustrates how any act conceived as an “attack” on NGOs and the media can ultimately affect every Bulgarian citizen. The draft law proposed registering as “foreign agents” all legal entities and—note this carefully—natural persons who have received more than BGN 1,000 from abroad over a five-year period. Under such provisions, hundreds of thousands, and even millions, of Bulgarian citizens would be classified as “foreign agents” simply because they receive financial support from relatives (children, spouses, cousins, and others) who live and work abroad.

For years, the Bulgarian diaspora has been the country’s largest foreign investor. Hundreds of thousands of Bulgarian citizens work in Western Europe, the United States, Canada, and other countries (their number in Russia, China, and other BRICS countries is significantly smaller; even supporters of these destinations tend to send their children to study in Western Europe rather than to the East or the Global South). These citizens regularly send part of their savings back to Bulgaria to renovate their homes, support their relatives, and cover everyday expenses. As a result, the relatives of Bulgarians living abroad—quite possibly you, dear reader—would be labeled as foreign agents. Roma neighborhoods, as well as many other districts, would effectively be designated as hubs of foreign agents.

Whether this step would be followed by the taxation of all funds coming from abroad, including remittances from Bulgarians living overseas, is a question few can answer with certainty. However, it cannot be ruled out that such a measure could be presented as a “final solution” to addressing the chronic gap in the state budget and its revenues—framed as: “We are not raising taxes, nor introducing new ones; we are simply collecting revenues that have so far remained untaxed.”

There is little doubt, however, that the primary targets of the LRFA are the media and civil society organizations—particularly those capable of criticizing the political elite. The Bulgarian state budget categorically does not finance civil society organizations. Unlike most European countries, especially in Western Europe, Bulgaria’s public funding for NGOs is more than modest. For years, the state budget has allocated the paltry sum of BGN 1 million to support civil society projects—a sum that, notably, remains unused.

Yet almost every Bulgarian citizen could ultimately become a victim of such legislation—not only by being labeled a “foreign agent,” but also by facing the very real possibility of additional tax burdens.

I will set aside the undeniably negative impact this law would have on Bulgarian democracy as a whole. It is no coincidence that its sources of inspiration—countries such as Russia and Georgia, and even EU Member States like Hungary and Slovakia—are hardly regarded as showcases of democratic governance.

For years, the Eurosceptic and nationalist party Vazrazhdane has repeatedly proposed the Law on the Registration of Foreign Agents (LRFA) in successive parliaments. The bill was rejected on the final plenary day of the 50th National Assembly, only to be reintroduced by the same party immediately after the formation of the current (as yet) parliament. In early February 2025, the LRFA was once again rejected.

At first glance, the outcome appeared to reflect broad consensus: only 38 out of 198 Members of Parliament voted in favor of the bill. The remainder opposed it—112 voted against, while 48 abstained. Support came exclusively from the bill’s sponsors in Vazrazhdane (34 MPs) and four deputies from the Socialist Party. However, a closer examination of the vote by parliamentary groups suggests that, for some parties, the decision was driven primarily by short-term political considerations.

The LRFA was unequivocally rejected by the two main pro-European coalitions—GERB–SDS and PP–DB. Peevski’s DPS also voted unanimously against the bill. The situation was different among three other parties that supported the government at the time. There Is Such a People (ITN) abstained unanimously: 17 abstentions out of 17 MPs present. The other governing coalition partner, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, was notably divided: of the 10 Socialist MPs who voted, six abstained and four voted in favor of the bill, with none voting against it. DPS–DPS (commonly referred to as “DPS–Dogan”), which also supported the governing coalition, either did not participate in the vote or abstained—seven abstentions out of seven MPs present. MPs from the opposition party MECH also voted unanimously to abstain: 11 out of 11.

By the end of 2025, the political landscape had changed dramatically. Elections for a new National Assembly are forthcoming. Few would be surprised if the LRFA were to be reintroduced once again. How the parties represented in the current National Assembly—should they secure seats in the next parliament—will vote remains an open question, fraught with uncertainty. There is, without doubt, ample cause for concern.

2. The Attempt to Establish an “Anti-Soros” Parliamentary Committee

On 5 February 2025, the National Assembly also rejected the establishment of a “Temporary Committee to ascertain facts and circumstances related to the activities of George Soros and Alexander Soros and their foundations on the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, including their financing of Bulgarian natural and legal persons and non-governmental organizations, as well as to identify their links to political parties, magistrates, educational institutions, media outlets, business entities, and state authorities” (the title alone speaks volumes).

The proposal was submitted by DPS–New Beginning. In other words, if a reader of the preceding text had concluded that this party opposed pressure on the media and NGOs because it voted against the Law on the Registration of Foreign Agents (LRFA), this initiative demonstrates the opposite. The party openly embraced anti-Soros rhetoric, along with the associated attacks on private media outlets (other than those owned by the party’s leader) and on organizations funded by the Open Society Foundations, the America for Bulgaria Foundation, and similar donors.

Although at the time politicians were still speaking of a “sanitary cordon” around Peevski, many of them joined the initiative. The proposed committee was ultimately rejected, yet only 74 of the 179 MPs who voted opposed it outright. Another 43 abstained—which, while formally opposing the committee’s establishment, nonetheless sent an important political signal. The proposal received the support of 62 Members of Parliament, of whom only 29 were the sponsors from Movement for rights and freedoms MRF –New Beginning. The remaining supporters came unanimously from the co-governing There Is Such a People (ITN), the opposition party MECH, and five MPs from the co-governing Socialist Party.

Only the absence of MPs from Vazrazhdane, who left the chamber following the rejection of the LRFA, prevented the formation of the anti-Soros committee as early as February. It was evident that, for some political parties, distrust toward independent media and civil society organizations outweighed the proclaimed commitment to a “sanitary cordon.”

Further attempts by MRF –New Beginning to secure approval for this committee followed. In early October, its establishment came “within a hair’s breadth” of success, falling short by only two votes: 105 Members of Parliament voted in favor, while 107 voted against or abstained. One month later, however, the committee was ultimately established with the support of 111 MPs. It is telling that this support emerged in a “fraternal alliance” between MRF –New Beginning, Vazrazhdane, MECh, ITN, and the Bulgarian Socialist Party, while the only parties voting against or abstaining were the pro-European PP–DB and GERB–SDS. In other words, those who had abstained in February effectively shifted into active support—an evolution that could just as easily occur with respect to the Law on the Registration of Foreign Agents in a future parliament.

From the moment the anti-Soros committee was formed, it was clear that it was unlikely to produce any genuine revelations. During the early decades of Bulgaria’s transition from authoritarian, barracks-style socialism to democracy, the Open Society Foundation was among the most influential actors contributing to the country’s democratic and European trajectory, as well as to broader social development. In the most difficult years, the foundation awarded thousands of scholarships to university students and pupils (many of today’s anti-Soros critics among them), financed soup kitchens for pensioners and other vulnerable citizens, and provided a wide range of social support.

In reality, however, the committee’s mandate was not to examine this historical support, but rather to focus on activities from April 2025 onward. It was evident that the initiative primarily served the interests of a single politician and the media outlets aligned with him, while it remained unclear why it attracted the backing of so many other political actors. What is beyond doubt is that the establishment of such a committee both reflected and reinforced hostile rhetoric toward civil society.

In practice, the committee never began its work. The scheduled inaugural meeting failed to reach a quorum, as it was boycotted by the pro-European parties. A week later, civic protests against the state budget erupted, eventually leading to the resignation of the government. In December, GERB announced that it would seek the committee’s dissolution, arguing that the National Assembly has no legal basis to investigate private individuals or private foundations; that Parliament is not an investigative body; and that a committee with such a mandate undermines civil society and is incompatible with the principles of parliamentary democracy. According to the sponsors of the dissolution proposal, terminating the committee would help restore public trust and reduce political polarization.

It is highly likely that the proposal to dissolve the commission will not even be brought to a vote due to the imminent conclusion of the 51st National Assembly. However, it remains entirely possible that a similar “ad hoc commission” could be established in the future. Undoubtedly, the anti-NGO rhetoric fostered by such a commission is likely to continue evolving.

The surge of civic engagement in December 2025 could easily provoke an anti-civic backlash. A reference from 2013 illustrates this risk: following the February protests that led to the resignation of Borisov’s first government, deputies from the then-RZS party (likely unfamiliar to some, but the party – Order, Lawfulness, Justice – acted as a parliamentary support to the government at the time) proposed that all individuals serving on the boards of NGOs, including school boards, sports clubs, and similar organizations—encompassing tens of thousands of citizens—be required to publish their annual tax declarations. While this proposal was ultimately rejected at the last moment, it serves as a stark example of how far anti-civic attitudes among certain politicians can extend.

3. Restrictive practices by the Managing Authorities of various operational programmes continued in 2025, effectively constraining NGOs’ ability to make meaningful use of EU funding. These practices include the absence of advance payments for projects coordinated by NGOs, the application of the de minimis rule when civil society organizations apply for funding, and other administrative barriers.

In previous analyses, I have outlined these obstacles, as well as the lack of applicants under important operations such as “Desegregation…” and “Promoting Intercultural Education…”. As a result, NGOs are, in practice, unable to rely on EU funding through the “shared management” mechanism—that is, through operational programmes managed at national level.

It is therefore a positive development that in 2025 the European Commission continued its practice of decentralizing resources under the CERV Programme (the Brussels-managed “Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values” programme) by selecting national NGO operators. At present, this role is being successfully fulfilled by the Open Society Institute, the Bulgarian Fund for Women, and FRGI. These organizations organize competitive calls for thematic NGO projects, provide adequate advance payments, do not apply the de minimis rule, and—unsurprisingly—attract significant interest. In 2025 alone, between 200 and 300 organizations applied under the published calls.

Equally positive is the fact that the Bulgarian–Swiss Cooperation Programme and the EEA Financial Mechanism also launched calls and engaged NGO operators. In 2025, the Bulgarian–Swiss Programme introduced a Civil Participation and Transparency Mechanism through three large strategic projects and its first open, large-scale grant procedure. In practice, most meaningful NGO funding over the next two to three years is likely to be channelled primarily through these programmes.

At the initiative of the Amalipe Center, NGO operators under these programmes and NGO representatives on the Monitoring Committees of the ESF operational programmes met with Deputy Prime Minister Donchev, the Managing Authorities, and the Ministry of Finance to propose concrete steps to overcome barriers to civic participation. While they received unequivocal support from the Deputy Prime Minister, they encountered passive resistance from the Managing Authorities. Nonetheless, concrete discussions were initiated on measures to address these obstacles. The government’s resignation a month and a half later will likely delay the identification and implementation of specific solutions.

4. The renewed Council for the Development of Civil Society (CDCS) began its work

In March and April, 150 organizations took part in the election of 14 NGO representatives to the Council. Under the leadership of Deputy Prime Minister Zafirov, the CDCS launched an active agenda, including the preparation of a Strategy for the Development of Civil Society and a corresponding funding plan.

The process is likely to experience a slight delay until the formation of a new government and the appointment of a new chair of the Council. More broadly, civil society organizations have for years faced the ongoing challenge posed by the rapid turnover of political leadership, which often requires that many initiatives and policy efforts be restarted—and repeated—time and again.

5. Developments in education: a particularly dynamic year

The year 2025 was particularly dynamic in the field of education. In April, the Ministry of Education and Science (MES) announced its plans to introduce a compulsory subject, “Virtues and Religions,” which received support from religious leaders (the Patriarch and the Chief Mufti) but also skepticism and opposition from numerous civil society organizations, parents, and students. The Ministry took this feedback into account and softened its position, announcing alternative confessional programs (Orthodox Christianity and Islam) as well as a non-confessional program, “Virtues and Ethics,” and began preparing them, including representatives from NGOs in the process.

In May, the MES proposed, and in July, the Council of Ministers submitted to Parliament a draft amendment to the main Education Act. The amendments covered nearly 20 topics, including desegregation, language support, repeating the first grade, the introduction of the compulsory subject “Virtues and Religions,” and more. As expected, hundreds of organizations, teachers, educational experts, institutions, and citizens submitted comments and proposals on the MES draft—over 750 proposals, setting a kind of record. The “sudden death” (to use a sports term) of the 51st National Assembly will result in the failure of this initiative—the draft amendments were adopted at first reading, and proposals for a second reading were made, but there will not be time for them to be voted on (and, importantly, there is clearly no consensus on them). Nevertheless, some of the positions advocated are likely to find a place in future discussions.

6. Advocacy and legislative efforts by civil society organizations

Over the past year, civil society organizations actively championed the adoption of the Volunteering Act—underscoring, once again, how essential volunteering is for society as a whole. They also engaged in shaping amendments to the Transparency in Governance Act (commonly referred to as the Lobbying Act), advocating that legitimate civic advocacy should not be equated with lobbying for private interests, among other initiatives.

While progress was made on these fronts, much of this work will need to be revisited and advanced again in the next parliament.

7. Unprecedented wave of civic engagement in 2025

A particularly notable development in 2025 was the unprecedented surge of civic activity. This energy manifested not only in the mass protests of December but also throughout the year in ongoing campaigns and initiatives led by volunteers and NGO representatives.

Although their efforts often go unnoticed or undervalued, these actions represent a crucial foundation for the conflict-free and harmonious development of society, as well as for the strengthening of Bulgarian democracy and the country’s pro-European trajectory.

Youth engagement: a source of optimism

The activity of young citizens—often labeled as “Gen Z,” “millennials,” or “Generation Alpha” (terms I prefer to avoid due to their overly broad and imprecise nature)—is a source of great encouragement and optimism. Field-based organizations have been observing and nurturing this engagement for years, noting that it takes place across all regions and among representatives of all ethnic communities.

A 2022 study by the Open Society Institute and the Amalipe Center, conducted among nearly 2,000 youth from vulnerable school communities, found that 48% participated in volunteer activities and campaigns. Two years later, a similar survey involving 4,000 high school students produced comparable results, with no significant differences observed across ethnic groups.

Amalipe Center in 2025

Amalipe is a Roma organization that works for better education and the empowerment of the Roma community, with 259 schools across the country, a network of hundreds of educational mediators, actively engaged youth, and local communities. We do not claim that our work is unique; on the contrary – we are convinced that many other NGOs work and achieve results that benefit the whole society.

During the past 2025:

• We continued to support the informal network of educational mediators, which includes over 350 educational mediators. In 2025, the National Network of Educational Mediators was also established as a legal entity.
• We continued to develop the network of schools “Every Student Will Be a Winner” which received a new name: “Mission Achiever: Inspired to Succeed.”
• We reached 44,163 students in 256 schools.
• In 56.95% of the schools, there were no dropouts.
• 99.16% of 7th-grade graduates continued their education at the secondary school level.
• 86.47% of high school graduates completed 12th grade.
• 23.85% of 12th-grade graduates decided to continue their education and apply to university.
• The average dropout rate in the network we work with is around 1.6%.
• The number of secondary school students successfully passing the State Matriculation Exams (DZI/matura) is increasing: young people participating in civic volunteer activities organized by Amalipe achieve results higher than the national average. The average grade in schools of the “Every Student Will Be an Achiever” Network is 3.05, while the average grade for Bulgarian Language DZI among students who passed the exam is around 3.75.
• We helped resolve or prevent over 260 cases of early marriage, a problem we have been actively addressing for years. In 2025, we conducted a study on the issue and young people prepared videos and other materials.
• We launched active initiatives such as peer trainings, discussions with youth and parents to prevent early marriages and youth aggression, and consultations with parents and other stakeholders for prevention and resolution of early marriage cases. This initiative is being implemented jointly with the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy (MLSP), the State Agency for Child Protection (DACP), and other national and local institutions.
• We continued activities to ensure the sustainability of the “educational mediator” profession. The informal network of mediators we work with now exceeds 400 professionals.
• In July, we supported the creation and registration of the National Network of Educational Mediators 
• We participated in the development of the state standard “Educational Mediation.”
• We assisted dozens of schools in obtaining funding for appointing educational mediators through the state budget and relevant regulations. In 2025, together with the MES, we organized the “Educational Mediator of 2024” ceremony. We continue to support educational mediators nationwide in performing their duties on a daily basis.
• At our proposal, an amendment was made to the funding regulation, providing additional resources for institutions with a concentration of children and students from vulnerable groups. This provides additional funding for schools and kindergartens educating children from vulnerable communities.
• We continued advocacy efforts for active policies promoting equality, inclusion, and participation of Roma, for better education and educational integration. Ambassadors, deputy prime ministers, ministers, MPs, and other politicians participated in events we organized for the Roma New Year – Vasilitsa, International Roma Day – April 8, the opening of the new school year, and many others.
• We actively engaged in efforts to preserve and develop civil society: we published analyses on all issues related to threats to NGOs; Amalipe was selected as one of the organizations in the Council for the Development of Civil Society (SRGO), in the group preparing the Civil Society Development Strategy, and we contributed to preparing the main positions of SRGO and the civil sector.
• We actively participated in debates on introducing the compulsory subject “Virtues and Religions”: we conducted a rapid survey among teachers and principals, participated in the working group preparing the secular program “Virtues and Ethics”, advocating for topics such as tolerance, values among different ethnic groups, and more. From October, we initiated the introduction of topics on virtues in the “Ethnic Folklore – Roma Folklore” classes.
• We actively participated in debates on amendments to the main Education Act, advocating for provisions on desegregation, educational integration, language support, and more. Our proposals often corrected errors made by institutions. Many of them received support, and we will continue efforts for the remaining proposals (https://amalipe.bg/zpuo2/).
• We undertook various efforts to overcome obstacles to NGO participation in using EU funds: our analysis (https://amalipe.bg/ngo-barriers-bg/) outlined the main barriers, which we presented to monitoring committees, national and European institutions. We initiated a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Donchev and the managing authorities of the main operational programs, after which concrete discussions began to find solutions. We will continue these efforts until the EU programs are “opened” for real civic participation.
• In 2025, Amalipe was sought as a partner not only by national but also European institutions: we participated in the European Roma Platform, the EC expert group on Roma issues, the European Commissioner for Equality’s civic dialogue, and more .

In its activities, the organization receives support from hundreds of schools, teachers, educational mediators, youth activists, and local community leaders. Together, we work for a better future for both the Roma community and society as a whole.

Author: Deyan Kolev